RT Article
T1 How not to render an explanatory version of the evidential argument from evil immune to skeptical theism
JF International journal for philosophy of religion
VO 78
IS 3
SP 277
OP 284
A1 Howard-Snyder, Daniel
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2015
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1559345314
AB Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe's famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called 'skeptical theists'. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory version that is 'fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism'. I argue that he has done no such thing.
K1 Atheism
K1 Dougherty, Trent
K1 God
K1 GOOD & evil
K1 problem of evil
K1 ROWE, William L., 1931-2015
K1 Skeptical theism
K1 Theism
K1 Theodicy
K1 Trent Dougherty
DO 10.1007/s11153-014-9501-2