Ethics and Value in Naess’ Ecophilosophy
It appears that Naess thought his ecophilosophy could do without ethics. What made him think so? Since Naess was largely implicit about his metaethical views, I turn to Warwick Fox’ elaborate presentation of Naess’ ecophilosophy to find an answer. Doing so allows me to investigate what is insufficie...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Brill
2017
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| Dans: |
Worldviews
Année: 2017, Volume: 21, Numéro: 3, Pages: 251-261 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Næss, Arne 1912-2009
/ Fox, Warwick 1954-
/ Écologie profonde
/ Éthique
/ Morale
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| Classifications IxTheo: | NCB Éthique individuelle NCG Éthique de la création; Éthique environnementale VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Ethics
ontological presuppositions of Naess’ philosophy
realist notion value
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| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Résumé: | It appears that Naess thought his ecophilosophy could do without ethics. What made him think so? Since Naess was largely implicit about his metaethical views, I turn to Warwick Fox’ elaborate presentation of Naess’ ecophilosophy to find an answer. Doing so allows me to investigate what is insufficiently accounted for in Naess’ ecophilosophy, namely its ontological presuppositions. To be philosophically sound, Naess’ criticisms of ethics need to question the taboo against the so-called naturalistic fallacy, a commonplace in ethical theories since Hume. I argue that a realist notion of value—understood as a property of nature, operative in nature—provides ecophilosophy with a sorely needed ontological foundation. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5357 |
| Contient: | In: Worldviews
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685357-02103004 |