Ethics and Value in Naess’ Ecophilosophy
It appears that Naess thought his ecophilosophy could do without ethics. What made him think so? Since Naess was largely implicit about his metaethical views, I turn to Warwick Fox’ elaborate presentation of Naess’ ecophilosophy to find an answer. Doing so allows me to investigate what is insufficie...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Brill
2017
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| В: |
Worldviews
Год: 2017, Том: 21, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 251-261 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Næss, Arne 1912-2009
/ Fox, Warwick 1954-
/ Глубинная экология
/ Этика (мотив)
/ Мораль (мотив)
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| Индексация IxTheo: | NCB Индивидуальная этика NCG Экологическая этика; этика мироздания VA Философия |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Ethics
ontological presuppositions of Naess’ philosophy
realist notion value
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| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Итог: | It appears that Naess thought his ecophilosophy could do without ethics. What made him think so? Since Naess was largely implicit about his metaethical views, I turn to Warwick Fox’ elaborate presentation of Naess’ ecophilosophy to find an answer. Doing so allows me to investigate what is insufficiently accounted for in Naess’ ecophilosophy, namely its ontological presuppositions. To be philosophically sound, Naess’ criticisms of ethics need to question the taboo against the so-called naturalistic fallacy, a commonplace in ethical theories since Hume. I argue that a realist notion of value—understood as a property of nature, operative in nature—provides ecophilosophy with a sorely needed ontological foundation. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5357 |
| Второстепенные работы: | In: Worldviews
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685357-02103004 |