Explicit Reasons, Implicit Stereotypes and the Effortful Control of the Mind
Research in psychology clearly shows that implicit biases contribute significantly to our behaviour. What is less clear, however, is whether we are responsible for our implicit biases in the same way that we are responsible for our explicit beliefs. Neil Levy has argued recently that explicit belief...
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Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2015]
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Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2015, Volume: 18, Número: 2, Páginas: 251-265 |
Classificações IxTheo: | NCB Ética individual ZD Psicologia |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Assertibility
B Control B Mental actions B Explicit reasons B Implicit biases B Moral Responsibility |
Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Resumo: | Research in psychology clearly shows that implicit biases contribute significantly to our behaviour. What is less clear, however, is whether we are responsible for our implicit biases in the same way that we are responsible for our explicit beliefs. Neil Levy has argued recently that explicit beliefs are special with regard to the responsibility we have for them, because they unify the agent. In this paper we point out multiple ways in which implicit biases also unify the agent. We then examine Levys claim that the assertibility of explicit beliefs means that they have a unique way of unifying the agent by being available for syntactical operations. We accept that syntactical operations are important, but worry that they are less straightforwardly connected to the unification of agents than Levy claims. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9573-9 |