RT Article
T1 The Epistemic Norm of Blame
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 19
IS 2
SP 457
OP 473
A1 Coates, D. Justin
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2016
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1565743393
AB In this paper I argue that it is inappropriate for us to blame others if it is not reasonable for us to believe that they are morally responsible for their actions. The argument for this claim relies on two controversial claims: first, that assertion is governed by the epistemic norm of reasonable belief, and second, that the epistemic norm of implicatures is relevantly similar to the norm of assertion. I defend these claims, and I conclude by briefly suggesting how this putative norm of blame can serve as the basis for general norms of interpersonal generosity.
K1 Assertion
K1 Blame
K1 epistemic norms
DO 10.1007/s10677-015-9639-8