Fairness as Appropriate Impartiality and the Problem of the Self-Serving Bias
Garrett Cullity contends that fairness is appropriate impartiality (See Cullity (2004) Chapters 8 and 10 and Cullity (2008)). Cullity deploys his account of fairness as a means of limiting the extreme moral demand to make sacrifices in order to aid others that was posed by Peter Singer in his semina...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 19, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 695-709 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCA Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία ZD Ψυχολογία |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Δικαιοσύνη
B Moral Demandingness B Impartiality B Self-Serving Bias B Murphy B Poverty Alleviation B Cullity, Broome B Moral Obligation |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Σύνοψη: | Garrett Cullity contends that fairness is appropriate impartiality (See Cullity (2004) Chapters 8 and 10 and Cullity (2008)). Cullity deploys his account of fairness as a means of limiting the extreme moral demand to make sacrifices in order to aid others that was posed by Peter Singer in his seminal article Famine, Affluence and Morality. My paper is founded upon the combination of (1) the observation that the idea that fairness consists in appropriate impartiality is very vague and (2) the fact that psychological studies show the self-serving bias is especially likely to infect ones judgements when the ideas involved are vague. I argue that Cullitys solution to extreme moral demandingness is threatened by these findings. I then comment on whether some other theories of fairness are vulnerable to the same objection. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9665-6 |