RT Article
T1 On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 19
IS 5
SP 1211
OP 1223
A1 Sinclair, Neil
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2016
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1565751027
AB According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to F then it must be possible that A should F for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams’ claim is compatible with this ‘expansive’ account of what it is to act for a normative reason.
K1 Action
K1 Normative reason
K1 Practical deliberation
K1 Reasons internalism
K1 Schroeder
K1 Williams
DO 10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8