On the Infinite God Objection: a Reply to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef

Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that (1) abstract objects do not exist; (2) actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and (3) redefining omniscience as (G): for any proposition p, if God conscious...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (Auteur)
Collaborateurs: Erasmus, Jacobus (Antécédent bibliographique)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: Springer Netherlands [2016]
Dans: Sophia
Année: 2016, Volume: 55, Numéro: 2, Pages: 263-272
Classifications IxTheo:AB Philosophie de la religion
NBC Dieu
Sujets non-standardisés:B Kalam Cosmological Argument
B Omniscience
B Infinite God objection
B Abstract objects
Accès en ligne: Accès probablement gratuit
Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Résumé:Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that (1) abstract objects do not exist; (2) actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and (3) redefining omniscience as (G): for any proposition p, if God consciously thinks about p, God will either accept p as true if and only if p is true, or accept p as false if and only if p is false. I argue that there is insufficient motivation for showing (1) and (2) and that (G) is problematic as a definition of omniscience.
ISSN:1873-930X
Référence:Kritik von "The Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Objection (2015)"
Kritik in "Loke on the Infinite God Objection (2018)"
Contient:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-016-0539-8