RT Article
T1 Avoiding the Conflation of Moral and Intellectual Virtues
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 20
IS 5
SP 1037
OP 1050
A1 Wilson, Alan T.
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2017
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1567605486
AB One of the most pressing challenges facing virtue theorists is the conflation problem. This problem concerns the difficulty of explaining the distinction between different types of virtue, such as the distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues. Julia Driver has argued that only an outcomes-based understanding of virtue can provide an adequate solution to the conflation problem. In this paper, I argue against Driver’s outcomes-based account, and propose an alternative motivations-based solution. According to this proposal, intellectual virtues can be identified by the shared motivation for cognitive contact with reality, while moral virtues are identified by appeal to the characteristic motivations of kindness and justice. I defend the proposal by demonstrating that it produces plausible verdicts concerning the virtue status of candidate moral and intellectual virtues.
K1 Intellectual Virtue
K1 Moral Virtue
K1 The conflation problem
K1 Virtue epistemology
K1 Virtue Ethics
DO 10.1007/s10677-017-9843-9