RT Article
T1 Can religious and secular belief be rationally combined?
JF International journal for philosophy of religion
VO 82
IS 3
SP 299
OP 319
A1 Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2017
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1567861415
AB Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind. In this paper, we model religious people's minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model.
K1 Applied dutch book argument
K1 FAITH & reason
K1 Mind & Body
K1 OPINION (Philosophy)
K1 Opinion pooling
K1 Rationality
K1 Religious Aspects
K1 Religious Mind
K1 The problem of evil
K1 Theodicy
K1 THEORY of knowledge (Religion)
K1 Wittgensteinian tradition
DO 10.1007/s11153-017-9613-6