Can religious and secular belief be rationally combined?
Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to gro...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2017]
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| Em: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2017, Volume: 82, Número: 3, Páginas: 299-319 |
| (Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Fé
/ Personagem religioso
/ Racionalidade
/ Interpretação não religiosa
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| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Applied dutch book argument
B OPINION (Philosophy) B Mind & Body B Rationality B Theodicy B FAITH & reason B THEORY of knowledge (Religion) B Religious Aspects B Wittgensteinian tradition B Opinion pooling B Religious Mind B The problem of evil |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind. In this paper, we model religious people's minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-017-9613-6 |