Religious education and religious choice
According to the "religious choice case" for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religiou...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Routledge
[2015]
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Journal of beliefs and values
Έτος: 2015, Τόμος: 36, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 31-39 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | ΑΑ Θρησκειολογία AH Θρησκευτική Παιδαγωγική |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
religious choice
B doxastic voluntarism B Religious Education B Religious Belief B leap of faith B Personal Autonomy |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | According to the "religious choice case" for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the "possibility-of-truth case" remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1469-9362 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of beliefs and values
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/13617672.2015.1013817 |