Religious education and religious choice
According to the "religious choice case" for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religiou...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Routledge
[2015]
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| En: |
Journal of beliefs and values
Año: 2015, Volumen: 36, Número: 1, Páginas: 31-39 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AA Ciencias de la religión AH Pedagogía de la religión |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
religious choice
B doxastic voluntarism B Religious Education B Religious Belief B leap of faith B Personal Autonomy |
| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Sumario: | According to the "religious choice case" for compulsory religious education, pupils have a right to be made aware of the religious and irreligious paths open to them and equipped with the wherewithal to choose between them. A familiar objection to this argument is that the idea of religious choice reduces religion to a matter of taste. I argue, first, that this familiar objection fails and, second, that we nevertheless have good reason to reject the religious choice case. Religious and irreligious views have a core cognitive dimension that makes it inappropriate to talk of choosing between them. What I have elsewhere called the "possibility-of-truth case" remains the strongest justification for compulsory religious education. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-9362 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Journal of beliefs and values
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/13617672.2015.1013817 |