RT Article
T1 Relational Autonomy, Paternalism, and Maternalism
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 21
IS 3
SP 649
OP 667
A1 Specker Sullivan, Laura
A1 Niker, Fay 1987-
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2018
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/158486169X
AB The concept of paternalism is intricately tied to the concept of autonomy. It is commonly assumed that when paternalistic interventions are wrong, they are wrong because they impede individuals' autonomy. Our aim in this paper is to show that the recent shift towards conceiving of autonomy relationally highlights a separate conceptual space for a nonpaternalistic kind of interpersonal intervention termed maternalism. We argue that maternalism makes a twofold contribution to the debate over the ethics of interpersonal action and decision-making. Descriptively, it captures common experiences that, while not unusual in everyday life, are largely absent from the present discussion. Normatively, it describes a type of intervention with justification conditions distinct from the standard framework of paternalism. We explicate these contributions by describing six key differences between maternalism and paternalism, and conclude by anticipating and responding to potential objections.
K1 Autonomy
K1 Care Ethics
K1 Maternalism
K1 Paternalism
K1 relational autonomy
DO 10.1007/s10677-018-9900-z