Perceiving Other Animate Minds in Augustine

This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine's treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition...

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Κύριος συγγραφέας: Engelland, Chad (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
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Έκδοση: Philosophy Documentation Center [2016]
Στο/Στη: American catholic philosophical quarterly
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 90, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 25-48
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά:B Mind & Body
B Φιλοσοφία του νου
B AUGUSTINE, Saint, Bishop of Hippo, 354-430
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Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine's treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition: the separation of invisible spirit and visible body. The immediate self-awareness of mind includes awareness of life: that is, of animating a body. Each of us animates his or her own body; seeing other animated bodies enables us to see other animating souls or minds. Augustine's affirmation of animation lets us perceive that other minds are present, but Descartes's denial of animation renders others ineluctably absent. Augustine's soul is no ghost because his body is no machine.
ISSN:2153-8441
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/acpq201611473