Is a Thomistic Teory of Intentionality Consistent with Physicalism?
I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosoph...
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
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| Опубликовано: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2017]
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| В: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Год: 2017, Том: 91, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 1-28 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
KING, Peter
B Logical Positivism B Intentionality (Philosophy) B PASNAU, Robert B Naturalistic Fallacy |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (doi) |
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| 520 | |a I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosophy of nature, I develop a Tomistic theory of intentionality that supports a certain kind of anti-physicalism. I then consider criticisms of the Tomistic theory of intentionality raised by Peter King and Robert Pasnau. In reply I argue that (a) King's position would have the Scholastics adopt an approach to intentionality that fails to solve the very problem such a theory is supposed to address; and (b) contrary to Pasnau's objection, there are ample resources available to show that the Tomist does not commit a content fallacy. | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Logical Positivism | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Naturalistic Fallacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a PASNAU, Robert | |
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