RT Article
T1 Is a Thomistic Teory of Intentionality Consistent with Physicalism?
JF American catholic philosophical quarterly
VO 91
IS 1
SP 1
OP 28
A1 Madden, James D.
LA English
PB Philosophy Documentation Center
YR 2017
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1588248968
AB I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosophy of nature, I develop a Tomistic theory of intentionality that supports a certain kind of anti-physicalism. I then consider criticisms of the Tomistic theory of intentionality raised by Peter King and Robert Pasnau. In reply I argue that (a) King's position would have the Scholastics adopt an approach to intentionality that fails to solve the very problem such a theory is supposed to address; and (b) contrary to Pasnau's objection, there are ample resources available to show that the Tomist does not commit a content fallacy.
K1 Intentionality (Philosophy)
K1 KING, Peter
K1 Logical Positivism
K1 Naturalistic Fallacy
K1 PASNAU, Robert
DO 10.5840/acpq20161212104