Is a Thomistic Teory of Intentionality Consistent with Physicalism?
I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosoph...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2017]
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| In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Year: 2017, Volume: 91, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-28 |
| Further subjects: | B
KING, Peter
B Logical Positivism B Intentionality (Philosophy) B PASNAU, Robert B Naturalistic Fallacy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |