RT Article
T1 The Hypothetical Consent Objection to Anti-Natalism
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 21
IS 5
SP 1135
OP 1150
A1 Singh, Asheel
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2018
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1662930003
AB A very common but untested assumption is that potential children would consent to be exposed to the harms of existence in order to experience its benefits (if it were possible for us to ask and for them to respond). And so, would-be parents might appeal to the following view: Procreation is all-things-considered permissible, as it is morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if one has good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent-and procreators can indeed reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent. I argue that this view is in error. My argument appeals to a consent-based version of anti-natalism advanced by Seana Valentine Shiffrin. Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. While, like Shiffrin, I stop short of advocating a thoroughgoing anti-natalism, I nevertheless argue that procreators cannot appeal to hypothetical consent to justify exposing children to the harms of existence. I end by suggesting a more promising route by which this justification might be achieved.
K1 Anti-natalism
K1 David Benatar
K1 Dignity
K1 Hypothetical consent
K1 Paternalism
K1 procreative ethics
K1 Seana Shiffrin
DO 10.1007/s10677-018-9952-0