Re-evaluating the hiddenness argument from above
J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument for atheism (2015) assumes that God's perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite person is consistent with their perpetual flourishing. However, I argue that if Aquinas-Stump's account of the nature of love is true, then any finite pe...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2019]
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2019, Τόμος: 85, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 193-211 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Deus absconditus
/ Θεός (μοτίβο)
/ Άνθρωπος (μοτίβο)
/ Αθεϊσμός (μοτίβο)
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός NBC Δόγμα του Θεού |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Nonresistant Nonbelief
B Atheism B Love B Motivational externalism B Hiddenness B Aquinas-Stump B Schellenberg |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Σύνοψη: | J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument for atheism (2015) assumes that God's perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite person is consistent with their perpetual flourishing. However, I argue that if Aquinas-Stump's account of the nature of love is true, then any finite person flourishes the most only if they attain the greatest degree of union among God and all relevant parties. Moreover, if Humean externalism is true, then any finite person might not have their greatest attainable degree of union among God and all relevant parties, as soon as possible, unless God sacrifices some time in the union-not the whole union-with them. Accordingly, God's perpetual openness might not be consistent with the future flourishing of any finite person-from which it follows that a crucial assumption of the hiddenness argument might not be true. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9676-z |