Truth, Meaning, and the Study of Religion
This paper focuses on two contrasting approaches to the theory of linguistic meaning and asks how they color a range of issues of interest to scholars of religion. The so-called truth-conditional approach makes truth basic. It trades on the thought that we sometimes or perhaps often know what someon...
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Brill
[2018]
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| In: |
Method & theory in the study of religion
Year: 2018, 卷: 30, 發布: 4/5, Pages: 357-377 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
真理
/ 語義學
/ 宗教學
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| IxTheo Classification: | AA Study of religion AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AD Sociology of religion; religious policy |
| Further subjects: | B
宗教
B Justification B Verification B Meaning B Truth |
| 在線閱讀: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| 總結: | This paper focuses on two contrasting approaches to the theory of linguistic meaning and asks how they color a range of issues of interest to scholars of religion. The so-called truth-conditional approach makes truth basic. It trades on the thought that we sometimes or perhaps often know what someone has said when we know what it would be for what she has said to be true. The other approach pegs meaning to how expressions and sentences are used in communicative situations. Dummett and Davidson are front and center. Davidson is of course in one sense a champion of truth-conditional semantics, but, over the issues I have in view, his case is instructively mixed. This discussion leads us toward an account of linguistic meaning which elevates over truth a family of concepts associated with use, including verification, justification, and pragmatic success. |
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| ISSN: | 1570-0682 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Method & theory in the study of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15700682-12341428 |