What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?
The ethics of biological procreation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet, as I show in this paper, much of what has come to be called procreative ethics is conducted in a strangely abstract, impersonal mode, one which stands little chance of speaking to the practical perspect...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
Lenguaje: | Inglés |
Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
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En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2020, Volumen: 23, Número: 1, Páginas: 71-87 |
Otras palabras clave: | B
Moral Philosophy
B Applied Ethics B Anti-natalism B David Benatar B meaning of life B Existentialism |
Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
Sumario: | The ethics of biological procreation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet, as I show in this paper, much of what has come to be called procreative ethics is conducted in a strangely abstract, impersonal mode, one which stands little chance of speaking to the practical perspectives of any prospective parent. In short, the field appears to be flirting with a strange sort of practical irrelevance, wherein its verdicts are answers to questions that no-one is asking. I go on to articulate a theory of what I call existential grounding, a notion which explains the role that prospective children play in the lives of many would-be parents. Procreative ethicists who want their work to have real practical relevance must, I claim, start to engage with this markedly first-personal kind of practical consideration. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10070-7 |