RT Article
T1 On justifying arguments of species membership
JF Bioethics
VO 34
IS 2
SP 159
OP 165
A1 Rothhaar, Markus 1968-
LA English
PB Wiley-Blackwell
YR 2020
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1727465865
AB In the debate about the moral status of human beings at the margins of life, arguments of species membership are often considered to be the least plausible ones. Against this backdrop, this article explores two possible ways to formulate feasible arguments of species membership. The first is an (in the broadest sense of the word) Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian argument; the second is an argument from the intrinsic logic of human rights, which Robert Spaemann refers toas a ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ argument. On these grounds, the article proposes a philosophical justification for an at least moderate speciesism.
K1 Embryo
K1 life form
K1 Moral Status
K1 Person
K1 Recognition
K1 Species
K1 Speciesism
DO 10.1111/bioe.12657