Misusing uteruses? Childrearing capacity and access to transplantable wombs
In light of recent successful uterus transplantations, it is reasonable to expect that womb transplants will become more commonplace in the future. If this happens, important questions emerge about who should receive the donated wombs. Some arguments have been advanced that suggest that potential re...
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
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| Опубликовано: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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| В: |
Bioethics
Год: 2020, Том: 34, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 105-113 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | NCH Медицинская этика |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
infertilitism
B allocation of scarce medical resources B childrearing capacity B uterus transplantation |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Итог: | In light of recent successful uterus transplantations, it is reasonable to expect that womb transplants will become more commonplace in the future. If this happens, important questions emerge about who should receive the donated wombs. Some arguments have been advanced that suggest that potential recipients should be screened for their anticipated childrearing capacity, as one component of a comprehensive process for determining eligibility. The main arguments provided in support of this position have to do with the presumed responsibility of the state to protect future children from harm, and with avoiding complicity for any resulting harm experienced by the child born through the transplanted uterus. The purpose of this paper is to reject this position, based on two main criticisms: (1) screening potential uterus recipients for anticipated childrearing ability, but not also screening other kinds of morally equal family builders, is unjustly discriminatory; and (2) with respect to actions performed in good faith (e.g. providing a transplantable uterus to someone for the purpose of having a child), one is not morally blameworthy for the consequences of those actions (a) that one did not intend, and (b) that were directly caused by someone else, and (c) where others are directly responsible for making sure that those consequences do not come about. These criticisms are sufficient for concluding that the state is not justified in assessing the anticipated childrearing capacity of potential uterus recipients, and this is so regardless of whether or not there is a scarcity of transplantable uteruses available. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12694 |