Theology, Free Will, and the Skeptical Challenge from the Sciences
Given how central free will and moral responsibility are for theology, Christian theologians should not remain at the sidelines when scientists and philosophers debate recent empirical results about human agency. In this article, the core notion of free will is identified with the agent's cogni...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Routledge
2020
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| Dans: |
Theology and science
Année: 2020, Volume: 18, Numéro: 3, Pages: 391-409 |
| Classifications IxTheo: | CF Christianisme et science NBE Anthropologie VA Philosophie ZD Psychologie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Free Will
B Neuroscience B Pluralism B eliminativism B The Self B Moral Responsibility B Theological Anthropology |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | Given how central free will and moral responsibility are for theology, Christian theologians should not remain at the sidelines when scientists and philosophers debate recent empirical results about human agency. In this article, the core notion of free will is identified with the agent's cognitive ability to exert control over his or her actions thereby making moral responsibility possible. Then three scientifically inspired arguments for free will skepticism are outlined: the argument from eliminativism, the argument from determinism and the argument from epiphenomenalism. The remainder of the article explores novel responses to these arguments and draws some theological implications from them. |
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| ISSN: | 1474-6719 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Theology and science
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2020.1786218 |