In defense of a regulated market economy
The dominant understanding of political corporate social responsibility (CSR) suggests new, broader political roles for businesses in the globalized economy, challenging the classical liberal social order (where business firms’ task is to focus on economic issues and the government's role is to...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
[2015]
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| Em: |
Journal of global ethics
Ano: 2015, Volume: 11, Número: 1, Páginas: 99-109 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Political corporate social responsibility
B classical liberalism B Globalization B division of moral labor B Responsabilidade social da empresa B regulated market economy |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Resumo: | The dominant understanding of political corporate social responsibility (CSR) suggests new, broader political roles for businesses in the globalized economy, challenging the classical liberal social order (where business firms’ task is to focus on economic issues and the government's role is to take care of political responsibilities). In this paper, we show how the major framing of the political CSR discussion not only challenges the classical liberal social order but also goes against the more general political economic perspective of the regulated market economy (where strict and [in most cases] strong boundaries exist between business and politics). We argue that this latter tendency of the political CSR discussion is its main weakness. We introduce a Rawlsian reframing of political CSR that is in line with the idea of a global-regulated market economy and compatible with some of the basic global ethical aims of the political CSR movement. |
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| ISSN: | 1744-9634 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of global ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2015.1004464 |