Subjektivität und Naturalismus
By reference to Nagel's classical paper, »What is it like to be a bat?«, I analyze the subjectivity of consciousness. I then go on to discuss two physicalistic attempts to reduce consciousness: Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory and Kriegel's self-representationalism. Both theori...
| Άλλοι τίτλοι: | Christliches Menschenbild und Naturalismus$dPhilosophische Standortbestimmungen |
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Γερμανικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Echter
2011
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| Στο/Στη: |
Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
Έτος: 2011, Τόμος: 133, Τεύχος: 3/4, Σελίδες: 340-360 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Παράλληλη έκδοση: | Μη ηλεκτρονικά
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| Σύνοψη: | By reference to Nagel's classical paper, »What is it like to be a bat?«, I analyze the subjectivity of consciousness. I then go on to discuss two physicalistic attempts to reduce consciousness: Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory and Kriegel's self-representationalism. Both theories, I argue, fail because they presuppose self-consciousness and are unable to reduce it. This leads me to consider the relation between subjectivity and self-consciousness. I conclude that every conscious State, in that it is subjective, is, in a basic sense, self-conscious too. Therefore, consciousness can only be reduced if self-consciousness is. |
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| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
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