Subjektivität und Naturalismus
By reference to Nagel's classical paper, »What is it like to be a bat?«, I analyze the subjectivity of consciousness. I then go on to discuss two physicalistic attempts to reduce consciousness: Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory and Kriegel's self-representationalism. Both theori...
| Otros títulos: | Christliches Menschenbild und Naturalismus$dPhilosophische Standortbestimmungen |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Alemán |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Echter
2011
|
| En: |
Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
Año: 2011, Volumen: 133, Número: 3/4, Páginas: 340-360 |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | No electrónico
|
| Sumario: | By reference to Nagel's classical paper, »What is it like to be a bat?«, I analyze the subjectivity of consciousness. I then go on to discuss two physicalistic attempts to reduce consciousness: Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory and Kriegel's self-representationalism. Both theories, I argue, fail because they presuppose self-consciousness and are unable to reduce it. This leads me to consider the relation between subjectivity and self-consciousness. I conclude that every conscious State, in that it is subjective, is, in a basic sense, self-conscious too. Therefore, consciousness can only be reduced if self-consciousness is. |
|---|---|
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
|