Subjektivität und Naturalismus
By reference to Nagel's classical paper, »What is it like to be a bat?«, I analyze the subjectivity of consciousness. I then go on to discuss two physicalistic attempts to reduce consciousness: Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory and Kriegel's self-representationalism. Both theori...
| Outros títulos: | Christliches Menschenbild und Naturalismus$dPhilosophische Standortbestimmungen |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Alemão |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Echter
2011
|
| Em: |
Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
Ano: 2011, Volume: 133, Número: 3/4, Páginas: 340-360 |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Não eletrônico
|
| Resumo: | By reference to Nagel's classical paper, »What is it like to be a bat?«, I analyze the subjectivity of consciousness. I then go on to discuss two physicalistic attempts to reduce consciousness: Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory and Kriegel's self-representationalism. Both theories, I argue, fail because they presuppose self-consciousness and are unable to reduce it. This leads me to consider the relation between subjectivity and self-consciousness. I conclude that every conscious State, in that it is subjective, is, in a basic sense, self-conscious too. Therefore, consciousness can only be reduced if self-consciousness is. |
|---|---|
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
|