Respect for persons and the allocation of lifesaving healthcare resources
Many ethicists argue that we should respect persons when we distribute resources. Yet it is unclear what this means in practice. For some, the idea of respect for persons is synonymous with the idea of respect for autonomy. Yet a principle of respect for autonomy provides limited guidance for how we...
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2021
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| En: |
Bioethics
Año: 2021, Volumen: 35, Número: 5, Páginas: 392-399 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NBE Antropología NCC Ética social NCH Ética de la medicina |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Resource Allocation
B Utilitarianism B Respect B Stephen Darwall B Respect for persons B Contractualism |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | Many ethicists argue that we should respect persons when we distribute resources. Yet it is unclear what this means in practice. For some, the idea of respect for persons is synonymous with the idea of respect for autonomy. Yet a principle of respect for autonomy provides limited guidance for how we should distribute scarce medical interventions. In this article, however, I sketch an alternative conception of respect for persons—one that is based on an ethic of mutual accountability. I draw in particular upon Stephen Darwall’s writings on respect and the second-person standpoint. I consider the implications of this conception of respect for the distribution of scarce, lifesaving healthcare resources. A second-personal account of respect rules out aggregative approaches to distribution, and instead requires that we give individual consideration to the claims that persons in need make on the resources in our control. The principles that we use to govern our allocation of resources, furthermore, should be principles that are acceptable to all reasonable agents. Building on this insight, the final section of this paper considers how a principle of need can be used as a means to make decisions about the allocation of lifesaving resources. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12857 |