RT Article
T1 No-fault Unbelief Defended: a Reply to Roberto Di Ceglie
JF Sophia
VO 60
IS 2
SP 473
OP 479
A1 Lougheed, Kirk
LA English
PB Springer Netherlands
YR 2021
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1762668971
AB In the philosophy of religion, ‘no-fault unbelief’ represents the view that a person can fail to believe that God exists through no fault of their own. On the other hand, ‘flawed unbelief’ says a person is always culpable for failing to believe that God exists. In a recent article in Sophia, Roberto Di Ceglie argues that some might find the usual reasons for rejecting ‘no-fault unbelief’ (i.e. intellectual or moral failure) to be offensive. In light of this, he proposes an alternative rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ based on the consequences it entails for both non-believers and believers. I argue that Di Ceglie does not do nearly enough to establish these consequences. I conclude that his rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ is at best incomplete or at worst false.
K1 Di Ceglie
K1 Divine Hiddenness
K1 Flawed unbelief
K1 No fault unbelief
K1 Reasonable disagreement
DO 10.1007/s11841-020-00817-1