No-fault Unbelief Defended: a Reply to Roberto Di Ceglie
In the philosophy of religion, ‘no-fault unbelief’ represents the view that a person can fail to believe that God exists through no fault of their own. On the other hand, ‘flawed unbelief’ says a person is always culpable for failing to believe that God exists. In a recent article in Sophia, Roberto...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2021
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| En: |
Sophia
Año: 2021, Volumen: 60, Número: 2, Páginas: 473-479 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
No fault unbelief
B Divine Hiddenness B Reasonable disagreement B Di Ceglie B Flawed unbelief |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | In the philosophy of religion, ‘no-fault unbelief’ represents the view that a person can fail to believe that God exists through no fault of their own. On the other hand, ‘flawed unbelief’ says a person is always culpable for failing to believe that God exists. In a recent article in Sophia, Roberto Di Ceglie argues that some might find the usual reasons for rejecting ‘no-fault unbelief’ (i.e. intellectual or moral failure) to be offensive. In light of this, he proposes an alternative rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ based on the consequences it entails for both non-believers and believers. I argue that Di Ceglie does not do nearly enough to establish these consequences. I conclude that his rejection of ‘no-fault unbelief’ is at best incomplete or at worst false. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-020-00817-1 |