Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism
Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. "Theism" leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God's exist...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2021
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| En: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2021, Volumen: 13, Número: 1, Páginas: 25-50 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Teísmo
/ Realismo moral
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| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión NBC Dios NCA Ética |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
moral explanationism
B Moral Realism B Theism B Naturalism |
| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (doi) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. "Theism" leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God's existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be valid and compelling. Specifically, the arguments must take a stand on whether God is personal or a-personal, and how this affects God's relation to the natural world. |
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| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v13i1.2884 |