Varieties of Theism and Explanations of Moral Realism
Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. "Theism" leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God's exist...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2021
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| В: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Год: 2021, Том: 13, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 25-50 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Теизм
/ Моральный реализм
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| Индексация IxTheo: | AB Философия религии NBC Бог NCA Этика |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
moral explanationism
B Moral Realism B Theism B Naturalism |
| Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (doi) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. "Theism" leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God's existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be valid and compelling. Specifically, the arguments must take a stand on whether God is personal or a-personal, and how this affects God's relation to the natural world. |
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| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v13i1.2884 |