RT Article
T1 State Formation in the Hebrew Bible: An Institutional Economic Perspective
JF Journal for the study of the Old Testament
VO 37
IS 4
SP 391
OP 422
A1 Wagner-Tsukamoto, Sigmund
LA English
PB Sage
YR 2013
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1777015332
AB This article analyzes the changing approach to state formation in the stories of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon. These stories are here scrutinized for features of emerging constitutional and institutional economic governance. This article inquires as to why initially a rather federalist structure under Joshua emerged, one that subsequently was replaced by more formally coordinated, hierarchical governance structures. It focuses on attack/defense costs and transaction costs that explain the emergence of state structures and their evolution over time. In addition, institutional economic concepts of political governance (that overcome anarchy and organize wealth creation in society) are projected to state formation in the Hebrew Bible. In this way, this article traces the early, yet pseudo-modern, economic history of a theory of state formation.
K1 transaction costs
K1 wealth creation
K1 attack/defense costs
K1 anarchy/violence
K1 Property Rights
K1 institutional economic governance
K1 state formation
DO 10.1177/0309089213483980