State Formation in the Hebrew Bible: An Institutional Economic Perspective
This article analyzes the changing approach to state formation in the stories of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon. These stories are here scrutinized for features of emerging constitutional and institutional economic governance. This article inquires as to why initially a rather federalist structure...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Sage
2013
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| Em: |
Journal for the study of the Old Testament
Ano: 2013, Volume: 37, Número: 4, Páginas: 391-422 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
transaction costs
B institutional economic governance B state formation B Property Rights B wealth creation B defense costs / attack B anarchy / violence |
| Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Recurso Electrónico
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| Resumo: | This article analyzes the changing approach to state formation in the stories of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon. These stories are here scrutinized for features of emerging constitutional and institutional economic governance. This article inquires as to why initially a rather federalist structure under Joshua emerged, one that subsequently was replaced by more formally coordinated, hierarchical governance structures. It focuses on attack/defense costs and transaction costs that explain the emergence of state structures and their evolution over time. In addition, institutional economic concepts of political governance (that overcome anarchy and organize wealth creation in society) are projected to state formation in the Hebrew Bible. In this way, this article traces the early, yet pseudo-modern, economic history of a theory of state formation. |
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| ISSN: | 1476-6728 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal for the study of the Old Testament
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/0309089213483980 |