RT Article
T1 Contents of Experience
JF Sophia
VO 48
IS 3
SP 237
OP 251
A1 Chadha, Monima
LA English
PB Springer Netherlands
YR 2009
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1785590448
AB In this paper I aim to situate the Naiyayika theory of perception in contemporary philosophy of mind. Following the ancients, I suggest we reconsider the taxonomy and the assumed interactions between kinds of perceptual content. This reclassification will lead us to reconsider some aspects of the Cartesian conception of mind that continue to influence the work of contemporary theorists. I focus attention on different accounts of sensory perception favoured by ancient Indian Naiyayika philosophers and Descartes as a starting point for reconsidering contemporary accounts of perceptual content.I show that Descartes' account of sensory perception provides the impetus for a causal-explanatory account of conceptual content in terms of its non-conceptual counterpart. Though contemporary philosophers claim to have cast off their Cartesian heritage, my discussion reveals that some of its tenets continue to influence the work of contemporary philosophers. I offer reasons for rejecting yet another Cartesian influence and recommend that we follow the Nyaya taxonomy of perceptual states.
K1 Nonconceptual content
K1 Concepts
K1 Perception
K1 Nyaya Epistemology
DO 10.1007/s11841-009-0095-6