An All-inclusive Interpretation of Aristotle’s Contemplative Life
The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis,...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
---|---|
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Springer Netherlands
2011
|
Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2011, Τόμος: 50, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 57-71 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Prudence (phronēsis)
B Wisdom (sophia) B Nicomachean Ethics B All-inclusive interpretation B Contemplation (theōria) B Happiness (eudaimonia) B Aristotle |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis, i.e., the Aristotelian philosopher or contemplator, in the strict sense, is someone who already possesses all the intellectual virtues (except technē), all the moral virtues (by way of the possession of phronēsis), and considerable other goods. If this thesis is correct, the inclusive and dominant interpretations will converge, for the philosopher turns out to be the happiest human being both in the inclusive and dominant senses. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-010-0203-7 |