An All-inclusive Interpretation of Aristotle’s Contemplative Life

The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis,...

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Κύριος συγγραφέας: Liu, Wei (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
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Έκδοση: Springer Netherlands 2011
Στο/Στη: Sophia
Έτος: 2011, Τόμος: 50, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 57-71
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά:B Prudence (phronēsis)
B Wisdom (sophia)
B Nicomachean Ethics
B All-inclusive interpretation
B Contemplation (theōria)
B Happiness (eudaimonia)
B Aristotle
Διαθέσιμο Online: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis, i.e., the Aristotelian philosopher or contemplator, in the strict sense, is someone who already possesses all the intellectual virtues (except technē), all the moral virtues (by way of the possession of phronēsis), and considerable other goods. If this thesis is correct, the inclusive and dominant interpretations will converge, for the philosopher turns out to be the happiest human being both in the inclusive and dominant senses.
ISSN:1873-930X
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-010-0203-7