Divine Hiddenness and Discrimination: A Philosophical Dilemma

Since its first delivery in 1993, J.L. Schellenberg’s atheistic argument from divine hiddenness keeps generating lively debate in various quarters in the philosophy of religion. Over time, the author has responded to many criticisms of his argument, both in its original evidentialist version and in...

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Главные авторы: Weidler, Markus (Автор) ; Aijaz, Imran (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Опубликовано: Springer Netherlands 2013
В: Sophia
Год: 2013, Том: 52, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 95-114
Другие ключевые слова:B Дилемма
B Divine Hiddenness
B Discrimination
B Love
B Explicit recognition
B J.L. Schellenberg
Online-ссылка: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Итог:Since its first delivery in 1993, J.L. Schellenberg’s atheistic argument from divine hiddenness keeps generating lively debate in various quarters in the philosophy of religion. Over time, the author has responded to many criticisms of his argument, both in its original evidentialist version and in its subsequent conceptualist version. One central problem that has gone undetected in these exchanges to date, we argue, is how Schellenberg’s explicit-recognition criterion for revelation contains discriminatory tendencies against mentally handicapped persons. Viewed from this angle, our present critique imparts Schellenberg’s position with a philosophical dilemma: (1) endorsing divine discrimination to the effect that God does not love ‘cognitive-affective outsiders’ or (2) giving up on explicit recognition. Either way, the hiddenness argument does not succeed.
ISSN:1873-930X
Второстепенные работы:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-011-0285-x