Corporate democracy and the rights of shareholders
Some have argued that because of weaknesses in corporate democracy, there is widespread abuse of shareholders' rights in American securities markets. I describe a number of “horror stories” that shareholders might tell to support this claim. Then I argue that despite appearances to the contrary...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
1988
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Στο/Στη: |
Journal of business ethics
Έτος: 1988, Τόμος: 7, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 99-108 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
American Security
B Horror Story B Security Market B Economic Growth B Widespread Abuse |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | Some have argued that because of weaknesses in corporate democracy, there is widespread abuse of shareholders' rights in American securities markets. I describe a number of “horror stories” that shareholders might tell to support this claim. Then I argue that despite appearances to the contrary, there is not widespread abuse of shareholders' rights in American securities markets. This is because (i) corporations, when doing things that look abusive, are generally violating neither the legal rights nor the “charter” rights of shareholders and (ii) shareholders — in their role as shareholders — have no other rights than these. |
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ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF00382003 |