Fictitious persons and real responsibilities
I believe that corporations should be held responsible for their actions. Traditional discussions about the moral responsibility of an organization have relied on a model of criminal intent. Demonstrating intent demands that we find a moral agent capable of intending, and this has led to problems. H...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
1995
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| Dans: |
Journal of business ethics
Année: 1995, Volume: 14, Numéro: 9, Pages: 761-767 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Real Responsibility
B Moral Responsibility B Moral Agent B Corporate Environment B Economic Growth |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | I believe that corporations should be held responsible for their actions. Traditional discussions about the moral responsibility of an organization have relied on a model of criminal intent. Demonstrating intent demands that we find a moral agent capable of intending, and this has led to problems. Here I replace the analysis based on criminal law by one based on tort law. Under this framework I suggest that corporations can be held responsible for the harms caused by their activities even if no person or persons in their decision making structure had formed malicious intent, since the sheer fact that the corporate environment encouraged or allowed negligence will be sufficient. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF00872329 |