The Limits of Shareholder Value
Shareholder value orientation has been introduced as a means to improve the performance of the corporation. The paper investigates the theoretical justification for the claim that increasing shareholder value is the purpose of corporate governance. It demonstrates that shareholder value is the contr...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2000
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| Στο/Στη: |
Journal of business ethics
Έτος: 2000, Τόμος: 27, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 137-148 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
holding structure
B stock options B Εταιρική διακυβέρνηση B Shareholder Value |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | Shareholder value orientation has been introduced as a means to improve the performance of the corporation. The paper investigates the theoretical justification for the claim that increasing shareholder value is the purpose of corporate governance. It demonstrates that shareholder value is the control principle, not the purpose of the firm. The idea that shareholder value is the only goal of the corporation is a mistaken transfer from the financial to the industrial firm. The paper also questions that the merger of manager interests and owner interests introduced by the remuneration of managers by stock options improves the management performance. The self-apportioning of stock options by the management is in danger of becoming a form of insider trading. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1006438000855 |