RT Article
T1 The Ethics of “Commercial Bribery”: Integrative Social Contract Theory Meets Transaction Cost Economics
JF Journal of business ethics
VO 88
IS 4
SP 791
OP 803
A1 Johnsen, D. Bruce
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2009
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1785635808
AB This article provides an ISCT analysis of commercial bribery focused on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumers. My analysis shows that actions condemned as commercial bribery in the Honda case (1996) may well have benefited Honda’s dealer network once promotional free riding and other forms of rent seeking by dealers are considered. I propose that the term “commercial bribery” should be avoided until after an ISCT analysis shows that the community is likely to have been harmed. The term “third-party payments” is a more ethically neutral term with which to begin the analysis.
K1 vertical arrangements
K1 Transaction cost economics
K1 ISCT
K1 informational role of prices
K1 free riding
K1 Federalism
K1 ethical rent seeking
K1 dealer promotion
K1 commercial bribery
K1 Business Ethics
DO 10.1007/s10551-009-0323-6