The Ethics of “Commercial Bribery”: Integrative Social Contract Theory Meets Transaction Cost Economics
This article provides an ISCT analysis of commercial bribery focused on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumer...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2009
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В: |
Journal of business ethics
Год: 2009, Том: 88, Выпуск: 4, Страницы: 791-803 |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
commercial bribery
B Transaction cost economics B Business Ethics B vertical arrangements B Federalism B dealer promotion B ISCT B free riding B informational role of prices B ethical rent seeking |
Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Итог: | This article provides an ISCT analysis of commercial bribery focused on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumers. My analysis shows that actions condemned as commercial bribery in the Honda case (1996) may well have benefited Honda’s dealer network once promotional free riding and other forms of rent seeking by dealers are considered. I propose that the term “commercial bribery” should be avoided until after an ISCT analysis shows that the community is likely to have been harmed. The term “third-party payments” is a more ethically neutral term with which to begin the analysis. |
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ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-009-0323-6 |