Market Fairness: The Poor Country Cousin of Market Efficiency

Both fairness and efficiency are important considerations in market design and regulation, yet many regulators have neither defined nor measured these concepts. We develop an evidencebased policy framework in which these are both defined and measured using a series of empirical proxies. We then buil...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs: Aitken, Michael J. (Auteur) ; Aspris, Angelo (Auteur) ; Foley, Sean (Auteur) ; de B. Harris, Frederick H. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2018
Dans: Journal of business ethics
Année: 2018, Volume: 147, Numéro: 1, Pages: 5-23
Sujets non-standardisés:B Algorithmic trading
B G28 Financial Institutions and Services
B Market fairness
B Market quality
B Manipulation
B Government Policy and Regulation
B Information leakage
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:Both fairness and efficiency are important considerations in market design and regulation, yet many regulators have neither defined nor measured these concepts. We develop an evidencebased policy framework in which these are both defined and measured using a series of empirical proxies. We then build a systems estimation model to examine the 2003–2011 explosive growth in algorithmic trading (AT) on the London Stock Exchange and NYSE Euronext Paris. Our results show that greater AT is associated with increased transactional efficiency and reduced information leakage in top quintile stocks. For less liquid stocks, manipulation at the close declines. We also document the tradeoff between reduced spreads and increased manipulation or information leakage following the introduction of MiFID1.
ISSN:1573-0697
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2964-y