Kantian Group Agency
Although much work has been done on Kant’s theory of moral agency, little explored is the possibility of a Kantian account of the moral agency of groups or collectives that comprise individual human beings. The aim of this paper is to offer a Kantian account of collective moral agency that can expla...
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2019
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Anno: 2019, Volume: 154, Fascicolo: 4, Pagine: 917-927 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Group deliberation
B Group agency B Collective agency B Kantian business ethics B Corporate agency B Group maxim B Kant |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | Although much work has been done on Kant’s theory of moral agency, little explored is the possibility of a Kantian account of the moral agency of groups or collectives that comprise individual human beings. The aim of this paper is to offer a Kantian account of collective moral agency that can explain how organized collectives can perform moral (or immoral) actions and be held morally responsible for their actions. Drawing on Kant’s view that agents act by incorporating an incentive into their maxims, it is argued that groups of agents can engage in practical deliberation in much the same way individual agents can, resulting in the formulation of a distinctive “group maxim” for which the group, as such, can be morally responsible. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-018-3891-5 |