Practical rationality for pluralists about the good
I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and o...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2003
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Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2003, Volume: 6, Número: 2, Páginas: 161-177 |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Axiology
B Deontology B Incommensurability B Practical rationality B Consequentialism B Normative ethics |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1024472726317 |