Practical rationality for pluralists about the good
I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and o...
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2003
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2003, 卷: 6, 发布: 2, Pages: 161-177 |
| Further subjects: | B
Axiology
B Deontology B Incommensurability B Practical rationality B Consequentialism B Normative ethics |
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Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 总结: | I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1024472726317 |