RT Article
T1 Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference it Should Make
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 8
IS 3
SP 239
OP 264
A1 Sneddon, Andrew
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2005
UL https://www.ixtheo.de/Record/1785693441
AB P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, R. Jay Wallace, and Philip Pettit for problems due to individualistic assumptions.
K1 Wolf
K1 Wallace
K1 Strawson
K1 Ravizza
K1 Pettit
K1 Moral Responsibility
K1 Moral Psychology
K1 Individualism
K1 Fischer
K1 Externalism
DO 10.1007/s10677-005-2484-4