Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters

Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim th...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cowley, Christopher (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2005
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2005, Volume: 8, Issue: 3, Pages: 277-290
Further subjects:B Peter Singer
B Cora Diamond
B Moral Imagination
B Wittgensteinian ethics
B moral persuasion
B Animal Rights
B Moral Reasons
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1785693468
003 DE-627
005 20220112044054.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220112s2005 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s10677-005-0351-y  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1785693468 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1785693468 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Cowley, Christopher  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Changing One’s Mind on Moral Matters 
264 1 |c 2005 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Contemporary moral philosophy assumes an account of what it means to legitimately change one’s mind in ethics, and I wish to challenge this account by enlarging the category of the legitimate. I am just as eager to avoid illegitimate mind-changing brought on by deceit or brainwashing, but I claim that legitimacy should be defined in terms of transparency of method. A social reformer should not be embarrassed to admit that he acquired many beliefs about justice while reading Dickens. As such, appeals to the heart and the imagination are just as legitimate, within limits, as appeals to the mind; and showing can be as legitimate as telling. To demonstrate this, I consider the example of a vegetarian trying to ‘convert’ a carnivore. I then ask what it means when the carnivore claims to have been previously mistaken. 
650 4 |a Wittgensteinian ethics 
650 4 |a Peter Singer 
650 4 |a Moral Reasons 
650 4 |a moral persuasion 
650 4 |a Moral Imagination 
650 4 |a Cora Diamond 
650 4 |a Animal Rights 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Ethical theory and moral practice  |d Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998  |g 8(2005), 3, Seite 277-290  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320527093  |w (DE-600)2015306-5  |w (DE-576)104558555  |x 1572-8447  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:8  |g year:2005  |g number:3  |g pages:277-290 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504353  |x JSTOR 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-0351-y  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
936 u w |d 8  |j 2005  |e 3  |h 277-290 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4033752366 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1785693468 
LOK |0 005 20220112044054 
LOK |0 008 220112||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2021-12-30#E69C55D47EB102263B5093766614044F6BF670C9 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504353 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw